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                     A Short Outline of the Indicativity Theory of Knowledge
     In this paper, I outline an Indicativity account of Knowledge. Some main ideas are, briefly, as follows: First, Indicativity is a relation between actual events/states, roughly somewhere in the neighborhood of the converse relation of causation, when both are considered at the type as well as at the token level. This paper focuses on the token level, having Knowledge as our main interest. The main core idea of the Indicativity account of Knowledge is that a true belief (token) qualifies as knowledge when the belief state in question highly token-indicates the fact it specifies. Thus, for a given belief state, representable as ‘x believes that p’, that this belief is true yields that ‘p’ specifies a fact. Token-indicativity is a relation between two token events, as pervasive in nature as causation is, and the proposal is that Knowledge is a cognitive phenomenon that instantiates high token-indicativity in human (or animal) cognition. Token indicativity comes in degrees, and particular true belief states amount to knowledge when qualify as high token-indicators of the facts they specify. Below I explain more what token indicativity amounts to, but to start with an example in mind, consider the rain yesterday that left the ground wet (a token causal relation). In turn, the wet ground today token-indicates (is indicative of) the rain yesterday.
   Further, a second, and separate thesis, is that, like token causation, token indicativity is analyzable in terms of chances. If this works out, we can have a relatively precise account of Knowledge, which may well project a probabilistic semantics of knowledge ascriptions, which would then smoothly interface with other chance-based semantics, such as those that have been proposed for counterfactuals and causation.1 
     Token indicativity is normally manifested by causal relations. But their contours are of a different type when the corresponding causal relations are sufficiently different. Different modes of knowledge suggest different kinds of causal relations that underpin them. There is thus no reason to expect that the chance manifestations of high token indicativity would be the same in different domains where different cognitive and perceptual mechanisms are at work. The truth conditions for knowledge ascriptions therefore need to be spelled out, in terms of chance, separately for the various modes of knowledge, one at a time.
    In the main section 4 below, I spell out some main components of the high token-indicativity theory of knowledge as it is manifested in the mode of Perceptual Knowledge and Knowledge by Memory. The main ideas of this account are as follows.  First, token indicativity, captured in chance terms, is a condition to the effect that, given a world-state (say) right before the occurrence of the fact specified by the true perceptual belief in question, the chance of that fact is significantly higher if it is conditionalized (i.e., ‘resorts to the information provided by’, very roughly speaking) on the belief ascription in question. This higher ‘retrospective’ (‘backward looking’) chance provided by the belief manifests its being a token indicator of the fact it specifies.
   In our case, as is usually (though not always) the case with knowledge, the true (token) belief state is temporally later than the fact it specifies. As usual with chance-based analyses, hard questions arise as to which intermediate events (i.e., in our case of perceptual knowledge, temporally between the fact and the belief) needs to be held fixed in the conditional chance conditions under considerations. So an indispensable precisification of the above constraint on Knowledge requires that the above inequality with the conditional probabilities of that sort (i.e., one conditional on the belief in question, one not) needs to be sufficiently high when the appropriate intermediate events are taken into account (i.e., conditionalized on). Further, the conditional chance with the belief in question being conditionalized on above needs to be quite high. 
   Another main component, specific to perceptual knowledge, is the requirement of Discriminability, and its associated so-called Contrast Class. The discriminability constraint requires that the subject be, so to speak, able to discriminate the predicate that figures in the perceptual belief in question from other predicates in the contrast class given the particular circumstances of the token belief in question.2 This qualitative characterization is captured by a particular chance condition, which is an elaboration of the above chance-formulated high token-indicativity condition. In general, it can be shown that such discriminability condition entails the corresponding indicativity condition, and that therefore, in the case of perceptual knowledge, high token- discriminability already carries the constraint that the corresponding high token- indicativity does. The contrast class in turn is governed by a minimal chance-constraint for the properties that figure in it. 
    A last main feature highlighted by this account that I would call attention to here is the following: A clear desideratum on fixing the extension of ‘know’ is that the standard of what counts as being known be high. But the higher the standard, the fewer the items that qualify for knowledge are (and similarly regarding what we take ourselves to know, over and above the Truth condition vis-à-vis  the content clause).  on the account presented below, there are three thresholds that figure in the analysis of Perceptual Knowledge: the threshold of the high conditional chance mentioned above, the discriminability threshold -- associated with the discriminability condition, and the Contrast Class threshold. For a particular threshold, say the Contrast Class threshold, a balance is struck between the above two conflicting needs and desiderata: The lower the threshold is, the more candidates for contrastive predicates are admitted (viz., predicates against which the predicate that figures in the content-clause of a particular knowledge ascription must satisfy discriminability), and accordingly the more stringent the discriminability test imposed on candidates for knowledge-ascriptions is, since the predicate in the content clause ‘p’ (think of it, for simplicity, as F in: Fa) then needs to pass the discriminability test vis-à-vis more predicates in the Contrast Class. But then the lesser is the extension of ‘know’. Yet, the lower that threshold is, the more the resulting knowledge relation is secure against discriminability errors, but then the fewer the candidates that pass the test for Knowledge are. A balance is needed to be struck, then: a requisite threshold must sufficiently reduce the chance of discriminability error while still allowing for a sufficiently large domain of items in the extension of ‘know’ (which, of course, in turn varies with different subjects, and which in turn determines what is known, simpliciter). A particular choice of the threshold of the contrast class fixes such a balance. My own position is that such a threshold is a semantic feature of ‘Know’ (perhaps in a dialect, maybe even in a local sub-dialect).3  
Section 1: What are indicativity, token indicativity, and an Indicativity Theory of Knowledge?             We have been aware of a number of prominent theories of Knowledge (or Knowledge Ascriptions) such as the Defeasibility account, the Reliability account (Goldman), the Aptness account (Sosa), the Counterfactual account (Nozick). The Indicativity account of Knowledge, outlined here, differs from traditional accounts in important respects. First, it locates the main natural property that Knowledge latches to as that of High Token Indicativity: Indicativity is a natural phenomenon akin to the converse relation of Causation, and its importance in the natural world is close to that of Causation. Roughly, for token indicativity, when one event (or state) token-causes another, then the latter, under favorable circumstances, token-indicates the first. Causes leave effects, such as traces, and such effects or traces, very often, under favorable circumstances, token-indicate their causes. So if my walking on the sand along the seashore at time t left traces – footprints, then the fact that I walked on the sand then caused the fact that my footprints were stamped on the sand then. These footprints normally will token-indicate the token event of my walk (then and there). 
      Token-indicativity is to be distinguished from type-indicativity as token-causation is distinct from type-causation. Type causation and type indicativity are relations between event types. Walks on sand leave footprints: The former event-type type-causes the latter event-type (footprints in the sand). (On my view, type causation as well as token causation consist of there being a sufficient number of corresponding token cases.)4  Accordingly, a token instance C of the first (say, walking on sand by a particular person at a particular time) typically causes a token instance I of the second, which in turn is an effect of it, and (under favorable conditions) token indicates it. So not all effects token-indicates their causes.
      Thus, sometimes many token-events are causes of the token event I which is a candidate for being a token indicator of a particular token-cause of it C. In many cases, such multiplicity of token causes undermines I’s being a high token indicator of C. In such a case, I may well be a mere token indicator of C, but not a high-token indicator of it. Token effects are by-and-large analogous to token causes, and high token indicators have considerable analogy with token causing (as distinct from merely being a cause).5  Causal impact, and therefore also causing, come in degrees, and so does token indicativity. 100 people, say (out of 150 voters), voted at t to elect a mayor. Each cast his own ballot (event Ci). The mayor was elected (I), and each Ci was a cause of I. But I is not a high token indicator of neither (although it does token indicate each – but to a very small degree). If many events were merely small causes of your true belief, the latter might not have highly token indicated any of them. 
      The main idea of the Indicativity Theory of Knowledge is that the natural phenomenon of token indicativity, which permeates nature, is also exemplified in relatively very small domain of human cognition (and maybe animal cognition) when certain true beliefs highly token-indicate their causes, where we focus here on their causes that are the facts are specified by the content clause of a corresponding true belief ascription. What is, among others, special about true beliefs is that they specify facts by the content-clauses (of suitable belief ascriptions of them). Such true beliefs, which are token states, may or may not highly token indicate the facts they so designate (more precisely, their content-clause designate).6 When they do, inter alia, roughly, they qualify as knowledge.
     But many true beliefs would fail to highly token indicate the facts they specify. If there is no appropriate causal relation between the two, normally7 the belief would fail to highly token indicate the fact specified by it. But even if the fact specified is a cause of, or even causes, the token belief-state in question, the latter may fail to highly token-indicate the former, in which case, according to the Indicativity Account of Knowledge, the true belief fails to qualify as knowledge.
    What we know is (by and large) due to causal connections, but more specifically, to the specific high token-indicativity relations that some of our true beliefs maintain as effects of the facts designated by them. Normally (not always), our true beliefs at time t are about a fact (specified by its content-clause of an appropriate belief ascription) that has taken place earlier: Sometimes immediately before, as is typical in perception, or in some cases long before, as in cases of knowledge by memory of hearing or reading, thereby tracking a source or a lineage of sources. But each link in the chain, e.g., an assertion, is a causal interaction, whereby the subject who (at the end of the chain) acquires a true belief does so due to a causal process in which his true belief is an effect of such a link – which, if the circumstances are favorable, would highly token indicate such a link, and as such, roughly, qualifies as knowledge. And similarly for processing/inferring, introspecting, use via other sense organs (that gauge effects).8 
Section 2: The value of knowledge, as high-token-indicativity         So what is so special about Knowledge? What distinguishes Knowledge from merely true belief, and why is it valuable? What is the value of Knowledge? The answer, on the Indicativity Theory of Knowledge, is straight forward:9 Causation is a very important relation in nature. And consequently, so is Indicativity. Knowledge is the instantiation of the natural token-indicativity relation in human cognition (when it comes to beliefs, which are, moreover, high token-indicators). The valuable, and special, aspect of Knowledge states is that they highly-token indicate the corresponding fact. That knowledge requires high token-indicativity correlates with there being something like a threshold for Knowledge Ascriptions. This threshold requires that Knowledge states be high token-indicators of the facts they specify; how high? – higher than the threshold. Knowledge can be therefore conjectures to be highly adaptive in demarcating beliefs that signal token causes of them (by highly token indicating them). Such an adaptive constraint would enter into the demarcation of the Knowledge Threshold – of demarcating which token-indicative beliefs should qualify as knowledge vs. the rest that shouldn’t.10  Singling out such subset of true beliefs enable to set rules or thumbs (heuristics) of when and how to transmit them to other subjects in your community, and when to act on them. Communication and action are thus governed to a large extent by what qualifies as knowledge.11 
    Furthermore: the general outlook of the high token-indicativity conception of knowledge, presented here, on which, for a token true belief to qualify as knowledge, it must instantiate high token-indicativity vis-à-vis the fact it specifies, yields, as an immediate consequence, an explanation for why luck does not play any role in high token-indicativity, and yet plays the requisite role in determining Knowledge. The high token indicativity conditions determine whether a given true belief does or does not qualify as knowledge. But they are well-defined regardless of whether the belief in question is true, and that a given belief satisfies them doesn’t determine whether it is true. For a true belief to qualify as a high token indicator of the fact it specifies also explains the high adaptive and practical value for focusing on such beliefs, as an immediate projection of the usefulness of the important relation of token indicativity. So on this high token-indicativity account of Knowledge, luck enters the picture only at the difference between a particular token belief being true and its satisfying the high token-indicativity conditions. But this remaining element of luck already positions a high token-indicative true belief way above being merely a lucky true belief. Further, this remaining element of luck is of the right sort, since it is a direct consequence of this account of knowledge qualifying as being fallibilist. 
Section 3: The modes of knowledge and analyzing knowledge ascriptions      Another main aspect of the Indicativity Theory of Knowledge is that it is manifested in different ways in the different modes of knowledge – such as perceptual knowledge, mediated knowledge – knowledge via testimony, introspective knowledge, inferential/processed knowledge, etc. Each particular mode specifies a type of causal route12  that is characteristic of knowledge states that qualify as being of that mode. Each causal-relation type is different, which requires a specific and distinct characterization of the high token-indicativity relation that holds when that causal-relation type yields knowledge. Hence a distinctive features of this high token-indicativity analysis of knowledge is that, despite the common core of high-token-indicativity, each mode is analyzed separately – as a different causal variation of high token-indicativity. The variety of analyses of knowledge, so far, have hardly availed themselves of the richness afforded in zeroing-in on what is at the heart of Knowledge, and yet by specifying how it implemented variably, according to the different modes. So an account of Knowledge Indicativity needs to be specified separately for each knowledge mode – though they all are bound together by sustaining high token indicativity. But since they causal instantiation of each mode is distinct, the conditions of their instantiation may differ, sometimes considerably. 
     Often a given knowledge-state is a superposition of two or more modes of token indicativity. Some or all may yield high token-indicativity, in which case the knowledge state would qualify as being knowledge of that mode. (Assuming, of course, truth, which I presuppose elsewhere too. Truth doesn’t follow from high token-indicativity, since essentially this conception is fallibilist, as indicated by threshold significantly less than 1 which has been hinted at above. See also below, section 4.) So knowledge states may be of a particular mode, but may also be of various modes. And sometimes, in the latter case, neither mode yields high token-indicativity according to that mode, but together they do, in which case the true belief-state in question qualifies as knowledge, even though not as knowledge of any particular mode.
   Token indicativity comes in degrees, and so does knowledge, as manifest in the vernacular by the degrees to which a particular knowledge state (of a person, at a time) can be considered to be robust. A degree of token indicativity may be below the knowledge threshold, and thus not high, in which case the true belief in question fails to yield knowledge. The robustness-grading of knowledge need not, however, yield full ordering, but may be partial, and thus two token knowledge states may not be comparable. This feature of knowledge is naturally couched in the conception of knowledge as high token-indicativity since, on that account, there are more than one gradable feature that are required to hold for there to be knowledge (this phenomenon is not unique to the indicativity conception of knowledge). Thus, different gradable features13 may combine to yield an aggregate robustness above the knowledge threshold, but the different gradable features of one knowledge state need not dominate (individually, of course) the corresponding features of another knowledge state (of the same subject, or different subjects), in which case the degree of robustness of these two knowledge states would not be comparable (i.e., whether one is more robust than the other would be indeterminate).14  
      In many papers I have offered a chance-based theory of token causation,15 where a fundamental theme was that token causation is  ex post facto higher chance, spelled out in a particular way. Compare this conception of causation with its indicativity counterpart as exemplified in the case of knowledge,16 which is, I argue, a particular sort of high token-indicativity. If such an account of causation is on the right track, it suggests that, like causation, indicativity is inherently a chance-based natural phenomenon, in view of the close, mirror-like, relations between causation and indicativity, at the token as well as the type levels. Consequently, it would be promising to attempt to flesh out the chance conditions that specify when, for a given mode of knowledge, a given true belief of that mode qualifies as knowledge. It is important to be aware that this conception of a chance-based account of knowledge combines two themes: One is the high token-indicativity feature, but another is a proposal of how this high token indicativity is instantiated in a given mode of knowledge in chance terms that yield a chance based characterization of when a true belief yields knowledge of that mode, and where different modes may be instantiated in a given belief token.17  
Section 4: An outline of an Indicativity Account of Knowledge for Perceptual Knowledge in chance terms                The two main insights of the account that are at the heart of the notion of knowledge is that the belief that p amounts to high token indicativity of the fact that p, and that knowledge endows high level of immunity from error. In this outline we shall deal with perceptual knowledge and perception-based memory. For these modes of knowledge, another condition is required, beyond that of high token indicativity, which secures the appropriate discriminability condition for knowledge. These conditions will be spelled out in terms of objective chance. So the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions of that sort will be in terms of truth, belief and chance alone. 
   I will assume an indeterministic chancy world, and will analyze de dicto knowledge ascriptions, which in turn suffice for an account of de re knowledge ascriptions, as I argue elsewhere,18 but de re knowledge ascriptions are not the subject of this paper. I will assume the standard necessary conditions for knowledge of truth and belief. For simplicity, the content clauses in the knowledge ascriptions will be taken to be of a simple subject-predicate form. For convenience, I will abbreviate 'x knows that p' as well as 'x's knowledge that p' by 'Kp', and accordingly 'x believes that p' as well as 'x's belief that p' by 'Bp'. To introduce the analysis of token indicativity, consider an example. Suppose the subject x (whom we consider as a candidate for knowing that p) is in a room, and p is: a bird just entered the room. For x to know that p, x's Bp must indicate the fact that p. This indication must be token, that is: the token belief that p must indicate the fact that p.19 For that to be the case, roughly, Bp must sufficiently raise the chance that p. We can formulate it in the following formula:
KIs      P(p/Bp.Wp) >> P(p/Wp),
where Wp is the history of the world just up to – but not including -- the occurrence time of the fact that p, 'Bp', as noted, abbreviates here 'x believes that p', '>>' indicates the relation of being significantly higher than, and 'P' is the chance function, which must be relativized to a given world state or world history. ('KI' is an acronym for 'knowledge indicativity', and 'KIs' signifies a simple version of KI – see below) 
    So in our example, x knows that a bird entered the room, and the subject beliefs: the object in front of me is a bird (call this content clause: p1, and abbreviate 'the object in front of me' as: OF).20 Kp1 (i.e.: x knows that p1) is true in view of Bp1's raising the chance of p1 (given Wp1). And indeed, in normal circumstances, with the subject x being properly constituted, in particular cognitively and visually, her Bp indeed yields a higher chance of p1 (as in the left side of KI) than the chance of p1 just given the history prior to p1 (the right side of KI). And given truth and Bp, which we will assume all along, KIs establishes (roughly) that Bp was a token indicator of p. (For knowledge, we also need to require that the left side of KIs be high enough, but we will not need this condition below, and so will ignore it.)
     This condition will need adjustments, since knowledge is a function of the intermediate history between p and Bp (however short it may be – in the case of perception, or long, in the case of memory). KIs, as presented here, is not a function of the intermediate history. A full fledged indicativity condition will require that we take into account the intermediate history by conditionalizing in an appropriate way on events in it, thereby yielding KI from KIs – where KIs is a simple version of KI (hence the qualification 'roughly' in the last sentence of the last paragraph). But since we will not need this refinement below, we shall ignore it. So for our purposes, I will use 'KIs' above as a place-holder for the its full-fledged version KI, and consequently use henceforth use only 'KI'.
   This condition is also deficient when P(p/Wp) is too high, by not leaving enough room for Bp to be effective in raising the chance of p in case of appropriate indicativity. This limitation can be handled by normalizing the chance function, but for simplicity we shall skip this move, and restrict ourselves to cases where P(p/Wp) is not too high. In order to accommodate this restriction (as well as the de dicto character of the analyzed notion of knowledge), let us stick throughout to a standard singular term in the content clause p -- 'the object in front of me', or for short: OF.21  
     But for perceptual knowledge and perception-based knowledge by memory another condition is needed, on top of KI, in order to secure appropriate discriminability, which obviously is needed for perceptual knowledge. KI just doesn't require enough discriminability which is necessary for perceptual knowledge. The appropriate discriminability condition for perceptual knowledge, however, is an extension of KI. In order for a subject x to be suitably discriminate a bird and a bat, say, the indicativity condition must be restricted to these two options alone: The indicativity of p by Bp, as reflected in KI must be conditional on a disjunction with p being one disjunct and where the other disjunct specifies another possibility to be discriminated from p. So assume that p1 is: OF is a bird (where D is: being a bird). For Kp1 to hold, given that, roughly speaking, there are visible bats around, the subject must be able to discriminate being a bird and being a bat (where T is: being a bat). For the requisite discriminability to hold, the subject's Bp must be indicative of p, as in KI, even after we conditionalize in both sides on: OF is either a bird or a bat. That is, even given this disjunction, Bp must still raise significantly the chance of p in order for the appropriate discriminability to hold. The satisfaction of this condition will yield token discriminability, that can be expressed simply by conditionalizing in KI on the disjunction: D(OF) V T(OF), which yields the following condition on the requisite discriminability for perceptual knowledge:
      P(p/Bp.(D(OF) V T(OF)).Wp) >> P(p/(D(OF) V T(OF)).Wp).
     More generally, where p is: F(OF) (which in our example was: OF is a bird, with 'D' being a substituends for 'F'), and were the requisite discriminability is vis-à-vis another feature G (which in this example was: being a bat, with 'T' being a substituends for 'G'), the more general form of the discriminability condition, to be abbreviated as 'Dis', yields: 
Dis-s      P(p/Bp.(F(OF) V F(OF)).Wp) >> P(p/(F(OF) V G(OF)).Wp).
As with KI, the discriminability condition should be a function of the intermediate course, which can be accomplished along the same lines as with KI, yielding the appropriate discriminability condition Dis (as opposed to the above Dis-s, which is Dis simplified, i.e., while ignoring the requisite dependence on the intermediate course). So in ignoring such elaboration, I will use only 'Dis' below. 
    But Dis is a schema, with G being a free variable. Yet not every predicate should qualify as having to be considered under Dis for the analysis of knowledge ascriptions. Thus, the predicate 'fake F', i.e., looking like F without being F, will fail Dis, since in normal cases a normal perceiver can't discriminate Fs from fake Fs even when she knows that OF is F. So not every predicate is suitable as a substitution instance of G in Dis. Let us call the set of suitable substitution instances for G in Dis the contrast class. The contrast class is thus the set of predicates that the subject must be able to token-discriminate from F (in p) for Kp to hold, as reflected in condition Dis. 
     The main constraint on the contrast class is that the predicate G belongs to it only if the chance that OF is G is not too low. If it is negligible, G need not be taken into account. This reflects the insight on knowledge that it must secure sufficiently high immunity from error – though not certainty. Formally, this condition can be expressed as:
CPP    A predicate G belongs to the contrast class for p (which is F(OF)) for the subject  
      x only if: 
CPP*     P(G(OF)/Wp) is not too low.
('CPP' abbreviates: contrastive predicates – prevalence). And indeed, if the chance of OF's being a fake bird is negligible, the subject need not be required to be able to discriminate birds from fake birds under the circumstances in order to know that OF is a bird. This condition captures the right constraint on the scope of the discriminability condition, as opposed to, say the requirement that there not be sufficiently many fakes around. (Dis requires also another constraint, which chiefly requires that G not be a sub-species of F. But in this super-light version we shall ignore it.) And as with condition KI above, perceptual knowledge requires not only that there be discriminability as in Dis, but that the left side of Dis be high. We shall ignore this part, again, since it will not play a role below.







                                                        NOTES

1. For my own chance-based account of Counterfactuals, see my “The Process-Causal-Chance-Based Analysis of Counterfactuals”, PhilPapers, June, 2015. For a previous version, see my A Theory of Counterfactuals, Hackett, 1986. 
2. For simplicity, I will resort alternately to properties and predicates that designate them. 
3. I thus don’t embrace Epistemic Contextualism, and argued at great length against it; see, e.g., "Rational Assertibility, the Steering Role of Knowledge, and Pragmatic Encroachment", PhilPapers, August, 2012; "A Counter-example to SSI and Contextualism", PhilPapers, October 2012; and “Action-Directed Pragmatics Semantics of Knowledge Ascriptions”, PhilPapers, June, 2015.
4. For the type causation part, see my "Causation: Counterfactual and Probabilistic Analyses", in  Counterfactuals and Causes, J. Collins, N. Hall, L. Paul (eds.), MIT University Press, 2004. 
5. Causing requires, on my view, roughly, being among the very few causes with around the highest causal impact on the effect in question. In my terminology, being merely a cause require only having a more than small degree of causal impact. See my "A Counterfactual Theory of Cause", Synthese 127, 3, June 2001, pp. 389-427, and .  “Probabilistic Cause, Edge Conditions, Late Preemption and Discrete Cases”, in  Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World, Phil Dowe and Paul Noordhof (eds.), Routledge, International Library of Philosophy series, pp. 163-188, 2003. 
6. This line of thought naturally leads to conceiving Reference as an even more special case of high token indicativity, where the referential use by a given term by a language speaker highly token indicates its referent, which thereby (together with other factors) constitutively contributes to its being a referent of it. For a richer development of this conception, see my “Reference as Consisting in High Token Indicativity” (draft). In my earlier work I attempted to capture such relevant relations by the notions of Knowledge and Causes; see, e.g., "A Theory of Thinker Reference", Philosophical Studies, 74, 1994, pp. 291-323, and "Mediated Reference and Proper Names", Mind, Vol. 102, October, 1993, pp. 611-628.  
7. Not always, as in Knowledge of Future; see my “Knowledge of the Future” (manuscript).
8. So does Knowledge of the Future, but in a special way. See my “Knowledge of Future” (forthcoming). 
9. The subject of the value of knowledge is rich. Here I merely pursue one line that naturally and fairly immediately follows from an Indicativity Theory of Knowledge. But see my “The Value of Knowledge” (manuscript).  
10. Thus, there needs to be a balance regarding roughly the percentage of true beliefs that qualify as knowledge. Being classified as knowledge often demarcate, in the common sense, the beliefs that one is entitled to act on, as an individual agent or jointly. An agent can be taken to decide on an action based on what he takes himself to know, which one may consider his Subjective Knowledge: An adequate analysis of knowledge should yield subjective knowledge via an immediate projected, derivative characterization, as does the Indicativity Theory of Knowledge below. 
11. Including joint action, which normally requires that the group acts on their joint subjective knowledge, which is what they (or most of them) take themselves to know, roughly. The notion of subjective knowledge is highly useful when employing a first-person-perspective, and is, on my view, the preferred ingredient for what an Epistemic Norm of Assertion should have as its main ingredient; see my “The Subjective Epistemic Knowledge Norm of Assertion” (unpublished).
12. I knowingly refrain from using the word ‘process’, since the heart of a chance-based theory of causation, and consequently a chance-based theory of high token indicativity, is that what grounds these phenomena are just chances – not processes, which are normally left undefined if not undefinable, and which, in the case of causation, willy-nilly eschew omissions, absences, preventions, double-preventions and more as causes. That causation and knowledge are at bottom chance-based phenomena need not detract from the analyses of the corresponding concepts in common-sense: Common sense does, and has, recognized likelihoods, which are gradable, with many distinguishable gradations in common-sense. This would suffice for a basis, with certain idealization, of a qualitative chance-function. 
13. E.g., in the high token indicativity case, the features of Very High Probability and of discriminability – see below. Defeasibility conceptions avail themselves to degree of justification and degree of confidence (belief); a reliability approach would avail itself to different degrees of reliability of the pertinent processes, and to the subject’s confidence; etc.
14. For an elaboration of related points, see my "The Non-Gradability of 'Know' is not a Viable Argument against Contextualism", PhilPapers, October, 2012, pp. 1-7. 
15. For a sample, see notes 1 and 2 above. 
16. I discuss here only knowledge conceived as a relation between a particular token belief of a certain subject. 
17. One can envisage two alternative and incompatible, and thus competing, chance-based proposals of truth conditions for knowledge ascriptions for a given mode where both manifest high token indicativity, though, presumably, one can be expected to fare better than the other.
18. On my view, the de re form is retrievable from the de dicto form, at least in main cases where there is pertinent conceptual acumen; see my "A Theory of Thinker Reference", Philosophical Studies, 74, 1994, pp. 291-323, section 1, and "Beliefs and Believing", Theoria, LII, 3, pp 129-145, 1986. 
19. This token indicativity should be contrasted with to indicativity, in which events of one type indicate events of another type. 
20. As noted, the pronoun 'me' will be adjusted as needed depending on whether the knowledge ascription is 1st person, 2nd person, 3rd person, etc. 
21. The indexical 'me' in OF will vary as needed with the ascriber, as between 'in front of me' and 'in front of x'.


